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‘I-I’ AND ‘I-ME’: TRANSPOSING BUBER’S 
INTERPERSONAL ATTITUDES TO THE 
INTRAPERSONAL PLANE 
ABSTRACT 
Hermans’ polyphonic model of the self proposes that dialogical relationships can be 
established between multiple I-positionsi (e.g. Hermans, 2001a). There have been few 
attempts, however, to explicitly characterise the forms that these intrapersonal relationships 
may take. Drawing on Buber’s (1958) distinction between the ‘I-Thou’ and ‘I-It’ attitude, it is 
proposed that intrapersonal relationships can take one of two forms: an ‘I-I’ form, in which 
one I-position encounters and confirms another I-position in its uniqueness and wholeness; 
and an ‘I-Me’ form, in which one I-position experiences another I-position in a detached and 
objectifying way. The paper goes on to argue that this I-Me form of intrapersonal relating is 
associated with psychological distress, and that this is for a number of reasons; most notably, 
because an individual who objectifies and subjugates certain I-position can not re-connect 
with more central I-positions when dominance reversal (Hermans, 2001a) takes place. On this 
basis, it is suggested that a key role of the therapeutic process is to help clients become more 
able to experience moments of I-I intrapersonal encounter, and it is argued that this requires 
the therapist to both confirm the client as a whole, and in terms of each of his or her different 
voices. 
INTRODUCTION 
As Hermans’ paper (this volume) outlines, the previous decade has witnessed substantial 
developments in a polyphonic model of the self (e.g. Hermans, Kempen and Van Loon, 1992; 
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Hermans, 2001a). In this model, the self is conceptualised as a ‘dynamic multiplicity of 
relatively autonomous I positions in an imaginal landscape’ in which ‘the I has the possibility 
to move from one position to the other in accordance with changes in situation and time’ 
(Hermans, Rijks and Kempen, 1993, p. 215).  
 
On the basis of this polyphonic model of the self, Hermans et al. (1993) – like numerous other 
self-pluralistic theorists (e.g. Berne, 1961; Stone and Winkelman, 1989) – have argued that 
dialogical relationship between different I-positions can be established. ‘The I in the one 
position’ writes Herman (2001a), ‘can agree, disagree, understand, misunderstand, oppose, 
contradict, question, challenge and ridicule the I in another position’ (p. 249). Within the self-
pluralistic literature, however, few attempts have been made to explicitly characterise, or 
examine in detail, the types of relationships that may exist between the different I-positions. 
Hermans and Kempen (1993) are an exception to this, and have distinguished between 
‘symmetrical’ and ‘asymmetrical’ intrapersonal relationships. However, their work focuses 
primarily on the issue of power, and does not go on to consider other aspects of the 
intrapersonal dynamic.  
 
This question of intrapersonal relationships may be of particular importance when considering 
the psychotherapeutic process from a polyphonic perspective. Within the self-pluralistic 
literature, numerous theorists and therapists have argued, either implicitly or explicitly, that 
psychological well-being is closely associated with the kinds of relationships that exist 
between the different I-positions. Moreover, there is a great deal of agreement as to the kinds 
of intrapersonal relationships that are associated with psychological well-being and 
psychological distress. Specifically, psychological well-being has been associated with clear, 
open and fluid communication between the different I-positions (e.g. Cooper and Cruthers, 
1999; Elliot and Greenberg, 1997; Hermans, 2001a; Shapiro, 1976; Vargiu, 1974; Watkins, 
1979); and with intrapersonal relationships that are harmonious (Shapiro, 1976; Vargiu, 
1974), respectful (Cooper and Cruthers, 1999), compassionate (Schwartz, 1999), accepting 
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(Stone and Winkelman, 1989; Vargiu, 1974), empathic (Elliot and Greenberg, 1997; Vargiu, 
1974), cooperative (Hermans and Kempen, 1993; Vargiu, 1974; Shapiro, 1976), democratic 
(Hermans and Kempen, 1993) and symmetrical (Hermans and Kempen, 1993). At the same 
time, several self-pluralistic theorists (e.g. Shapiro, 1976; Berne, 1961) have argued that 
healthy intrapersonal relationships are those in which each of the I-positions maintains a 
certain individuality, and do not fuse with, overlap into, or contaminate others. Several self-
pluralistic therapists and theorists have also argued that psychological well-being is associated 
with the existence of a ‘central’ I-position that is able to communicate openly and effectively 
with other I-positions, serving a coordinating and managerial role (e.g. Ferrucci, 1982; 
Schwartz, 1999; Shapiro, 1976; Sliker, 1992; Stone and Winkelman, 1989).  
 
Psychological distress, on the other hand, has been associated with the existence of 
conflicting relationships between the different I-positions (Elliot and Greenberg, 1997; 
Ferrucci, 1982; Shapiro, 1976; Vargiu, 1974). These are intrapersonal relationships in which 
the I-positions battle for dominance and control (Sliker, 1992; Vargiu, 1974) to the extent that 
they may try to entirely dissociate from, or obliterate, each other (Elliot and Greenberg, 1997; 
Shapiro, 1976). For self-pluralistic theorists, then, distress-related intrapersonal relationships 
are characterised by a lack of dialogue and communication between the various I-positions 
(Shapiro, 1962; Watkins, 1985), and by the existence of competitive, defensive (Redfearn, 
1985), dismissive (Shapiro, 1976; Watkins, 1985), derogatory (Watkins, 1985), manipulative 
(Vargiu, 1974), un-empathic (Watkins, 1985), and dominating/controlling (Hermans and 
Kempen, 1993; Watkins, 1985) modes of relating. Fused or dependent modes of intrapersonal 
relating may also be seen as distress-related, particularly where a central I-positions is 
‘contaminated’ by other I-positions, and is too weak to effectively implement a coordinating 
and managerial role (Shapiro, 1976; Berne, 1961). 
 
The aim of this paper is to draw these observations together and to deepen an understanding 
of the kinds of intrapersonal relationships that are associated with psychological well-being 
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and psychological distress. To do so, this paper will draw on one of most enduring 
distinctions in the field of interpersonal relationships: Buber’s (1958) distinction between the 
I-Thou and I-It attitude. Specifically, this paper will argue that psychological well-being is 
associated with the experiencing of I-Thou-like moments of encounter between the multiple I-
positions; whilst psychological distress is associated with the predominance of I-It-like 
relationships between the multiple I-positions. This paper begins, then, by examining Buber’s 
distinction between the I-Thou and the I-It attitude. 
I-THOU AND I-IT 
There are a number of elements to Buber’s (1958) distinction between the I-Thou and the I-It 
attitude. It should be borne in mind, however, that Buber’s philosophy was fundamentally 
holistic. Hence, these elements can not be understood in isolation: each is fundamentally 
inter-related to, and implied by, the others. The differences outlined below, then, need to be 
understood as facets of a difference-as-a-whole, rather than as independent dimensions. 
Experiencing versus relating 
One of the first distinctions that Buber (1958) makes between the I-It attitude and the I-Thou 
attitude is that, in the former, an other person is experienced, whilst in the latter, the other is 
related to. That is, in the I-It attitude, I distance myself from the other and survey, study, 
measure and observe him or her. The other becomes something apart from me, something to 
which I direct my attention and from which I extract knowledge. By contrast, ‘When Thou is 
spoken, the speaker has no thing; he has indeed nothing. But he takes his stand in relation’ (p. 
17). Here, I do not face the other, but stand alongside him or her. He or she is not the object of 
my experiencing, but an intrinsic part of my being-in-relation. ‘I do not experience the man to 
whom I say Thou’ writes Buber, ‘But I take my stand in relation to him, in the sanctity of the 
primary word. Only when I step out of it do I experience him once more’ (p. 22).  
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This I-Thou attitude also differs from an I-It attitude in that I have an immediate and direct 
encounter with the other. There is nothing that mediates the meeting: I do not meet my idea of 
the other, but confront him or her directly (Levinas, 1967). Furthermore, for Buber (1958) 
there are no ‘aims’, ‘anticipations’ or ‘lusts’ that intervene between I and Thou. In this 
relationship, I am not encountering the other for some purpose or some need. I do not want 
anything from him or her – or, at least, those needs have been put to one side. ‘Only when 
every means has collapsed’, writes Buber, ‘does the meeting come about’ (p. 25). 
‘It-ifying’ versus humanising 
In this objectifying, I-It attitude, the other is also experienced as a ‘thing’: an object, an entity, 
an ‘it’ (Buber, 1958). ‘He is then thought of as a being of size, surface area, weight, function, 
desire, consciousness, characteristics and capability of all sorts’, writes von Weizsäcker 
(1964, p. 407). I may experience the other, for instance, as ‘a depressive’ or as ‘a Jew’. This 
‘it-ification’ of the other has parallels with Sartre’s (1958) notion of ‘the look’, in which the 
gaze of one human being constantly threatens to objectify – or to use Laing’s (1960) term 
‘petrify’ – the being of the other. Whilst for Sartre, however, this objectification is the 
primary mode of human relatedness; for Buber, ‘If I face my human being as my Thou, and 
say the primary word I-Thou to him, he is not a thing among things’ (p. 21). That is, I also 
have the possibility of encountering the other as a vibrant, dynamic humanity: a ‘psychic 
stream’ (Buber, 1965, p. 70) that can not be objectified or labelled, but which I can only relate 
to in its fluidity and spontaneity. In Bakhtinian (1973) terms, I have the capacity to affirm 
someone else’s I, not as an object, but as another subject.  
Fragmenting versus relating to wholeness 
For Buber (1958), a further distinction between the I-It and the I-Thou attitude is that the 
former fragments what it experiences, whilst the latter relates to the other in its wholeness. In 
the I-It attitude, things are divided into sub-things: objects or people are analysed, reduced, 
broken down into essences, laws, or such parts as ‘id’, ‘ego’ and ‘superego’ (Freud, 1923). By 
contrast, in the I-Thou attitude, the other is beheld and revered in its totality. Buber gives the 
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example of relating to a tree, in which ‘everything, picture and movement, species and type, 
law and number, [is] indivisibly united in the event. Everything belonging to the tree is in 
this: its form and structure, its colours a chemical composition, its intercourse with the 
elements and with the stars, are all present in a single whole’ (p. 20). 
Construing as determined versus acknowledging freedom 
Buber (1958) also describes the I-It attitude as one in which the other is construed in 
determined, mechanistic terms, rather than as an other that is freely choosing and deciding its 
way of being. He, she or it is seen as something that is caused to be, that in driven by forces 
and mechanisms, rather than being encountered in his, her or its freedom and spontaneity. For 
instance, I may construe a client’s anger towards me as a consequence of his or her 
relationship with his or her father, rather than a choice that the client is making towards my 
immediate presence. ‘Causality’ writes Buber, ‘has an unlimited reign in the world of It’ (p. 
71). 
Experiencing in the past or future versus encountering in the present 
This leads on to a further distinction between the I-It and I-Thou attitudes. In the I-It attitude, 
the other is experienced in terms of pre-defined schemata: in terms of what has previously 
been experienced and known. In addition, as discussed above, in the I-It attitude, the other 
may be experienced in terms of future projects and needs: the other becomes an instrument 
for the actualisation of the I’s possibilities. In the I-It attitude, then, the I is not really 
experiencing an other at all. Rather, it is experiencing a ‘mirror’ of its own schemata and 
interests (Wood, 1969) – the other only exists in as much as it is an object for the self. By 
contrast, in the I-Thou relationship, the other is met in the immediate present. Hence, there is 
a breaking-through of a true otherness into the I’s world: a movement beyond a solipsistic 
engagement with the I’s own past or future.  
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Generalising versus individuating 
‘Every real relationship in the world is exclusive’, writes Buber (1958), it ‘rests on 
individuation, this is its joy – for only in this way is mutual knowledge of different beings 
won’ (p.128). By this, Buber means that the I-Thou attitude takes the other as unique, 
distinctive, and inexchangeable. It is an encounter with a particular being at a particular 
‘now’, which can not be replicated or repeated. By contrast, the experiencing of an It – an 
entity that is stripped of its complexity and individuality and experienced as a we-remember-it 
or as a I’ll-do-this-with-it – can be repeated over and over again. This exclusivity of the I-
Thou relationship has parallels with Bakhtin’s notion of the ‘once-occurrent event of being’: 
the one-off, unique meeting of two ‘freedoms’ which forms the basis for Bakhtin’s 
dialogically structured model of human being (Shotter, 1999). In contrast to Bakhtin, 
however, Buber does not see such once-occurrent meetings as the basis for all human 
interactions, but as an extra-ordinary mode of relating. For Buber, much interpersonal relating 
remains in the realms of the I-It: formulaic, general, and endlessly repetitive.  
Non-confirming versus confirming 
For Buber (1958), an I-Thou attitude also involves a fundamental confirmation of the other. 
Friedman (1985) defined this as ‘an act of love through which one acknowledges the other as 
one who exists in his own peculiar form and has the right to do so’ (p. 134). There are clear 
parallels here with Rogers’ (1957) notion of ‘acceptance’ or ‘unconditional positive regard’ – 
particularly the emphasis on the acceptance of the other in his or her wholeness. However, 
Buber (in Cissna and Anderson, 1997) makes it clear that confirmation involves an 
acceptance of the other in his or her potentiality – who he or she is meant to become – as well 
as in his or her present actuality, such that it may sometimes involve helping the person 
‘against’ him or herself. It is also important to note that confirmation involves an acceptance 
of the other in his or her ‘own peculiar form’. In other words, it is an acceptance of the other 
in his or her otherness, and is clearly distinct from both absorbing the other into one’s own 
schemata, and being absorbed by the other such that one’s own position and uniqueness is 
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lost. Indeed, as Buber (1958) points out, to fuse or merge with another person is not to 
encounter him or her: one can not encounter something that one is.  
Relating in fragments versus relating as wholeness 
As we have seen, Buber (1958) states that an I-Thou attitude is one in which an individual 
relates to the whole of the other. For Buber, however, such an I-Thou attitude also requires the 
I to bring his or her totality into the encounter. ‘[T]he primary word [I-Thou] can only be 
spoken with the whole being’ writes Buber, ‘He who gives himself to it may withhold nothing 
of himself’ (p. 23). The person who adopts an I-Thou attitude to the other, then, engages with 
the other in a transparent and open way, in which nothing is deliberately held back or 
obscured (though this does not necessarily entail a ‘universal un-reserve’ (Buber, 1947)). 
Furthermore, such a relationship requires the I to transcend a purely cognitive mode of 
relating, and to encounter the other as a cognitive-affective-embodied whole (Cooper, 2001). 
This contrasts with the I-It attitude, in which an individual engages with another in only a 
partial, non-transparent, or superficial way.  
Protectiveness versus willingness to take risks 
As we have seen, for Buber (1958), an I-Thou attitude requires an I to engage with a Thou in 
an immediate and spontaneous way – in a way that is open to the other’s freedom, uniqueness 
and otherness. For Buber, then, an I-Thou meeting is a ‘perilous’ and ‘unreliable’ encounter, 
in which ‘the well-tried context’ is ‘loosened’ and one’s ‘security shattered’. Furthermore, 
because the I is engaging with the other with the whole of his or her being, he or she has no 
firm foothold from which to control or determine the encounter – no external position of 
certainty or safety. Everything he or she is is thrown into the relationship, and this means that 
he or she may be changed by the encounter in ways that he or she cannot predict or control. 
As Buber writes: ‘The human being who emerges from the act of pure relation that so 
involves his being has now in his being something more that has grown in him, of which he 
did not know before and whose origin he is not rightly able to indicate’ (p. 140). This 
contrasts with the I-It relationship, in which the other is experienced in a predictable and 
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controllable – i.e. safe – way; in which a part of the self is always held back, such that there is 
never a full commitment to, or involvement with, the other.  
 
Whilst Buber rarely discusses the issue of power, there are clear parallels between the kind of 
I-Thou mutuality outlined here and above and the notion of symmetrical relationships 
discussed by Hermans and Kempen (1993). In both cases, there is a willingness to engage in a 
reciprocal way: to allow oneself to be affected by, as well as to affect, the other. This 
contrasts with an asymmetrical relationship, in which one voice tends towards dominating and 
controlling the other.  
Monologue versus dialogue 
One of the most useful ways, perhaps, of drawing together the distinctions that Buber makes 
between the I-It and I-Thou attitudes is by relating them – as Buber does – to monologue and 
dialogue. In his 1929 essay Dialogue (published in 1947), Buber distinguishes between three 
realms of communication: ‘genuine dialogue’, ‘technical dialogue’ and ‘monologue disguised 
as dialogue’. The first of these realms, genuine dialogue, corresponds most closely to Buber’s 
(1958) notion of the I-Thou attitude. For Buber (1947, 1965), genuine dialogue involves a 
turning towards the other: an openness to being addressed by the other in his, her or its 
present and particular otherness, and a confirmation of the otherness of the other. This is 
similar to the model of dialogue outlined by Linell and Marková (1993), in which a person’s 
position or formulation is modified in and through the dialogic exchange. For Buber, such 
genuine dialogue requires each respondent to bring what is really in his or her head to the 
dialogue, without artifice, seeming or pretence. However, as Buber emphasises, such dialogue 
does not require all of those involved to necessarily speak. For Buber, true dialogue and 
exchange can take place in silence. 
 
In contrast to Linell and Marková (1993), however, Buber (1947) does not consider all forms 
of discoursive interaction to be based on a dialogic form. Rather, he argues that the kind of 
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dialogue in which interactants genuinely respond to each others’ utterances are becomingly 
increasingly rare. Instead, he suggests, much modern communication takes the form of 
‘technical dialogue’, ‘which is prompted solely by the need of objective understanding’ (p. 
37). This is utilitarian, goal-focused communication, but communication in which real 
dialogue remains hidden away in ‘odd corners’, occasionally breaking through to the surface: 
‘as in the tone of a railway guard’s voice, in the glance of an old newspaper vendor, in the 
smile of the chimney-sweeper’ (p. 37).  
 
It is the third form of communication, ‘monologue disguised as dialogue’, however, that 
Buber (1947) seems to consider most prevalent in the contemporary world. By this, Buber 
means a form of communication that has a semblance of interpersonal openness and 
receptivity, but is essentially a turning towards, and concern with, oneself: a ‘reflexivity’, 
rather than a reaching out to an other. Here, ‘two or more men, meeting in space, speak each 
with himself in strangely torturous and circuitous ways and yet imagine they have escaped the 
torment of being thrown back on their own resources’ (p. 37). In this form of communication, 
each individual’s concerns are not with learning from the other, but with self-presentation and 
self-enhancement. Hence, spontaneity and transparency are replaced with artifice, phoniness 
and manipulation. Buber describes a number of forms of communication that make up this 
‘underworld of faceless spectres of dialogue’ (p. 38). In debate, for instance, points are not 
made as they exist in the protagonist’s mind, but are designed to strike home as sharply as 
possible – a ‘word duel’ that is far more about self-aggrandizement than any genuine learning. 
In speechifying, on the other hand, ‘people do not really speak to one another, but each, 
although turned to the other, really speaks to a fictitious court of appeal whose life consists of 
nothing but listening to him’ (1965, p. 69). 
Moments of I-Thou and Dialogue 
In concluding this section, two important points need to be noted. First, in drawing this 
distinction between I-Thou and I-It modes of relating, Buber (1958) is not suggesting that we 
 12
can consistently relate to others in an I-Thou, dialogic way. ‘It is not possible to live in the 
bare present’ (p. 51) he writes. For Buber, then, it is inevitable that we will sometimes relate 
to others and the world in an I-It manner. In this respect, the I-Thou attitude is best 
understood as something that we can experience moments of, rather than as something that 
we can experience on an on-going basis (Anderson and Cissna, 1997). Furthermore, Buber 
does not see the I-It attitude as inherently negative. For him, it is through objectifying, and 
separating from, entities and people that human beings can progress from an un-differentiated 
state of connectivity towards a deeper and more profound encounter (Woods, 1969). The I-
Thou and I-It attitudes, then, are seen as dialectically related. Hence, as with Heidegger 
(1966), Buber’s concern is not that we should consistently maintain an attitude of 
Gelassenheit (openness) towards the world. Rather, it is that we should not become so 
seduced by a technical and manipulative way of experiencing the world that we forget a more 
contemplative and relational possibility. As Buber writes: ‘without It man cannot live. But he 
who lives with It alone is not a man’ (p. 52).  
FROM EXTERNAL DIALOGUE TO INTERNAL DIALOGUE 
The basic premise of this paper, then, is that we can usefully transpose this interpersonal 
distinction to the intrapersonal plane. That is, that we can meaningfully distinguish between 
two particular modes of interpersonal relating. In the first of these, one I-position experiences 
another I-position in an it-ifying, fragmenting, generalised, non-confirming, fragmentary, 
protective and monologic way – construing the other I-position as determined and on the 
basis of past experiences or future desires. In the second form of intrapersonal relating, by 
contrast, one I-position relates to another I-position in a humanising, individualising, 
confirming, holistic, risk-taking, dialogic manner – in a way that takes the other as a present, 
choice-making whole. Drawing on James’s (1890) distinction between the ‘I’: the active self-
as-knower which has the features of continuity, distinctness and volition (Hermans, 2001a); 
and the ‘me’, the empirical self-as-known; this former mode of intrapersonal relating can be 
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referred to as an ‘I-Me’ self-relational stance, whilst the latter mode can be referred to as an 
‘I-I’ self-relational stance. In other words, in the I-I self-relational stance, the I in one position 
relates to the I in another position as an I: as an active, phenomenologically-experiencing, 
meaning-orientated being. By contrast, in the I-Me self-relational stance, the I in one position 
experiences the I in another position as a me: as an empirical, object-like entity. As with the I-
Thou attitude, the suggestion here is not that human beings can consistently relate to 
themselves in an I-I manner. Rather, the suggestion is that people may be able to experience 
moments of I-I relating to themselves, and that, as will be argued later, these moments of I-I 
encounter are of crucial importance in determining their psychological well-being. 
 
An example may help to illustrate this distinction between I-I and I-Me forms of self-relating, 
and how the various differences between an I-Thou and I-It attitude, as outlined above, can be 
transposed to the intrapersonal plane. Martha was a twenty-five year old female client who 
experienced intense and terrifying panic attacks, often in social situations where she felt an 
enormous pressure ‘not to put a foot wrong’ii. Martha’s relationship to this panicking, 
vulnerable I-position – from the adult, rational I-position that she tended to inhabit during the 
psychotherapy sessions – is a good example of an I-Me mode of intrapersonal relating. First, 
from her adult I-position, she tended to talk about her experiences of panic and terror, rather 
than relating to these experiences in an immediate and direct way. There was a sense of her 
surveying and studying this mode of experience from a distance – from the position of an 
‘objective’, disconnected observer – rather than standing alongside her terrors and fears and 
allowing herself to fully connect with them. Second, from her adult I-position, there was a 
tendency to ‘it-ify’ her vulnerable I-position. She described it as something that took her over, 
something that came from outside, rather than a fluid, meaning-orientated phenomenological 
stream of experiencing. Third, then, her adult I-position did not relate to the totality of her 
vulnerable I-position, but focused primarily on its behavioural and physical manifestations, to 
the exclusion of its intentional, meaning-orientated facets. Fourth, from her adult I-position, 
Martha had a great tendency to look for explanations as to why she was experiencing such 
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panic and terror, rather than considering the possibility that, in the midst of that vulnerable 
mode of being, she might be experiencing freedom and choice. Fifth, as touched on earlier, 
Martha, from her adult I-position, did not invoke a meeting with her vulnerable I-position in 
the present. Rather, it was something that she talked about in the past: how she had panicked, 
had felt afraid; and also something that she experienced in terms of her future: specifically, as 
a ‘block’ to becoming the person she wanted to be. Sixth, from her adult I-position, her 
experiences of panic were construed in generalised terms: her panic attacks were 
manifestations of a trans-personal disorder, rather than a particular mode by which she, as the 
individual she was, encountered her world. Seventh, from her adult I-position, Martha was 
entirely disconfirming of her vulnerable I-position. It was something she hated, detested, and 
was desperate to get rid of – in no way did she confirm or validate her vulnerability and fear. 
Eighth, Martha’s relationship to her vulnerable I-position, from her adult I-position, was an 
exclusively cognitive one. She analysed and deconstructed it, but did not allow herself to also 
engage with it in an emotional and embodied way. Ninth, from her adult I-position, Martha 
had no intention of allowing herself to open up to her fears and vulnerabilities, and letting 
herself be touched or affected by this way of being. In summary, then, we can say that 
Martha, from her adult I-position, was in no way willing to enter into a dialogue with her 
vulnerable I-position. She was willing to ‘speechify’ to it: to tell her fears that they were 
‘stupid’ and ‘unfounded’, but she was not willing to engage with them in a mutual and 
symmetrical way. 
 
As the therapy progressed, however, Martha was increasingly able to experience moments of 
I-I encounter between her adult and vulnerable I-positions. Here, Martha, from her adult I-
position, was able to temporarily stand in the shoes of her vulnerable self, and to remind 
herself of just how terrifying those moments of social anxiety were. She also became 
increasingly able to acknowledge that she was not ‘stupid’ or ‘cowardly’ for running away 
from social situations at these times, but that, from this I-position, this action seemed like the 
best way of dealing with her immediate situation. In this I-I mode of relating, then, Martha 
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became increasingly able to confirm her vulnerable I-position, and to accept its legitimacy 
within her intrapersonal world, rather than seeing it as a foe to be eliminated at all costs.  
 
This distinction between an I-I and I-Me self-relational stance is both supported and 
challenged from a dialogical theoretical standpoint. If, as Shotter (1999) suggests, our internal 
dialogue reflects essentially the same features as those exhibited in the transactions between 
people, and if we accept the distinction between the I-Thou and I-It attitude on the 
interpersonal plane, then it would seem legitimate to transpose this distinction to the 
intrapersonal plane. Indeed, from a Vygotskian (1962) developmental perspective, it could be 
argued that I-I and I-Me modes of self-relating are essentially internalisation of I-Thou and I-
It interpersonal relationships. That is, a child who is confirmed in his or her uniqueness by 
others learns to confirm and validate his or her I-positions; whilst a child who is it-ified and 
treated as a thing learns to relate to his or her I-positions in a similar way.  
 
From a Vygotskian (1962) standpoint, however, one needs to be very careful about 
transposing external functions to the intrapersonal plane. As Vygotsky argues, the process of 
internalisation leads to a transformation in the structure and function of a process, such that 
internal and external functions can never be seen as isomorphic. Moreover, Buber (in 
Anderson and Cissna, 1997) explicitly rejects the proposition that intrapersonal dialogue, 
however self-confirming, can ever be equivalent to interpersonal dialogue. This is on two 
accounts. First, because intrapersonal dialogue lacks the element of surprise; and second, 
because intrapersonal dialogue does not involve the prizing of another. Nevertheless, Buber 
acknowledges that there is a form of self-meeting that sits somewhere between interpersonal 
dialogue and intrapersonal monologue, and displays much agreement with Rogers’ suggestion 
(in Anderson and Cissna, 1997) that, in therapy, a client may have a ‘real meeting’ with 
aspects of himself or herself that he or she has never met before. 
 
 16
At other points in his writings, however, Buber (1947) suggests that any form of self-dialogue 
is, by its very nature, impoverished and dysfunctional: a turning inwards from one’s originary 
being-with-others. He writes:  
If a man does not represent the a priori of relation in his living with the world, if he 
does not work out and realise the inborn Thou on what meets it, then it strikes inward. 
It develops on the unnatural, impossible object of the I, that is, it develops where 
there is no place at all for it to develop. Thus confrontation of what is over against 
him takes place within himself, and this cannot be relation, or presence, or streaming 
interaction, but only self-contradiction. (pp. 93-94) 
 
Such ideas have been developed by existential psychiatrists like von Weizsäcker (1964), who 
assert that ‘The mentally ill person has no Thou for his I’ (p. 409). With respect to 
schizophrenia, for instance, von Weizsäcker has argued that the schizophrenic develops a 
hallucinatory double as a way of out of the unbearable loneliness of Thou-less-ness. As 
Rotenstreich (1967) points out, however, Buber (and his followers) tend to dichotomise self-
relating and other-relating: such that a ‘bending back to oneself’ necessitates a turning away 
from others, and vice versa. In contrast, however, many psychologists and psychotherapists 
(e.g. Fromm, 1963; Yalom, 1980) have argued that a close correlation exists between an 
individual’s attitude towards him or herself, and his or her attitude towards others. An 
individual, for instance, who values him or herself, is seen as being more likely to value 
others than an individual who hates him or herself. Indeed, there are times when Buber also 
approximates this position; writing, for instance, that: ‘in order to be able to go out to the 
other, you must have the starting place, you must have been, you must be, with yourself’ 
(1947, p. 39). Whilst a move towards internal dialogue, then, might necessitate a move away 
from external dialogue, this does not necessarily mean that the internal dialogue is thereby 
dysfunctional and impoverished. Rather, if a person is able to openly dialogue with him or 
herself, this may contribute to a greater openness at the interpersonal level, and hence, in 
Buberian terms, a greater level of psychological well-being.  
 
From a Buberian standpoint, however, a further objection can be raised to the notion of I-I 
self-relating. For Buber (1958), an I-Thou attitude requires a confirmation of the other in his 
 17
or her wholeness. An I-I attitude, on the other hand, is a relationship to just one aspect of the 
person. On this basis, it could be argued that any form of relating to one I-position is 
fundamentally it-ifying to the person-as-a-whole. An I-I stance towards one I-position, 
however, need not involve a turning away from other I-positions. Indeed, to the extent that an 
I-I self-relational stance confirms I-positions that are usually subjugated or disowned (see 
below), such a stance can involve a more holistic confirmation of the self. This means, 
however, that an I-I self-relational stance can not only be understood as one in which another 
I-position is encountered in terms of its exclusivity, but one in which it is encountered as part 
of a greater whole. This is part of the reason for using the term ‘I-I’: it is the I confirming that 
another I is part of the same I, rather than as a separate and distinct ‘me’.  
 
As a final point in this section: the distinction between dialogic, I-I forms of self-relating and 
monologic I-Me forms of self-relating raises some interesting questions about a ‘dialogical’ 
model of the self (e.g. Hermans, 2001a). If, as Shotter (1999) suggests, our internal dialogue 
reflect similar features to those exhibited in the transactions between people, then I-Me, 
monologic forms of self-talk may be much more prevalent in the intrapersonal world than I-I, 
dialogic forms. Hermans et al.’s (1993) fundamental assertion, then, that ‘the individual 
consists of multiple authors entering into dialogical relationships with each other’ (p. 213, 
italics added) may be overly-optimistic – at least, if ‘dialogue’ is used in the way that Buber 
intends it. On this basis, it may be more appropriate to refer to the self as ‘polyphonic’ or 
‘multivoiced’ rather than as ‘dialogical’ – terms that allow for the whole spectrum of dialogic 
and monologic (in Buberian terms) possibilities. At the very least, if Hermans and colleagues 
wish to retain the term ‘dialogical’, they will need to find a way of defining it such that it can 
incorporate the most objectifying and detached forms of self-talk; or, alternatively, 
demonstrate that such forms of self-talk are not present in the intrapersonal world. 
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THE I-ME SELF-RELATIONAL STANCE AND PSYCHOLOGICAL DISTRESS 
As a provisional hypothesis, it is proposed that a person’s psychological well-being is 
positively correlated with the prevalence of moments of I-I encounter between their multiple 
I-positions. As with the I-It relationship, this is not to suggest that all moments of I-Me 
relating are necessarily distress-related; indeed, at times they may be of positive benefit: for 
instance, when a person needs to quickly assess his or her capabilities for a task at hand. 
Nevertheless, as with the I-Thou and I-It relationship, it is proposed that, when a person 
experiences themselves predominantly or wholly in an I-It way, then he or she is likely to 
experience high levels of psychological distress. This is for a number of reasons.  
 
First, if the different I-positions are able to communicate with each other and acknowledge 
each other’s needs, then they are more likely to be able to work together to achieve the 
person’s goals. If, on the other hand, the I-positions refuse to confirm each other, then the 
resulting conflict is likely to absorb much of the individual’s attention, making them less able 
to fulfil their in-the-world projects. Cooper and Rowan (1999) sum this up by writing:  
Where there is a lack of communication, where selves disown each other or where 
one self dominates to the exclusion of all others, then the result tends toward a 
cacophony of monologues - a discordant wail which will always be less than the sum 
of the individual parts. But where selves talk to selves, where there is an acceptance 
and understanding between the different voices and an appreciation of diversity and 
difference, then there is the potential for working together and co-operation - an 
interwoven harmony of voices which may transcend the sum of the parts alone. (p. 8) 
 
Second, an I-I self-relational stance is associated with the experiencing of positive feelings 
towards oneself: such as acceptance, confirmation, openness, harmony, and a belief in one’s 
uniqueness, wholeness and humanity. By contrast, an I-Me self-relational stance is associated 
with derogatory, objectifying, rejecting, dis-confirming feelings towards one self. An I-I self-
relational stance, then, is more likely to be associated with a positive mood state than an I-Me 
self-relational stance.  
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Third, the existence of I-Me self-relational stances is likely to be closely associated with the 
creation and maintenance of ‘subjugated’ (Hermans and Kempen, 1993) – or what have also 
been termed ‘disowned’ (Stone and Winkelman, 1989), ‘shadow’ (Cooper, 1999), 
‘neglected’, ‘subdued’ and ‘suppressed’ (Hermans and Kempen, 1993; Hermans, 2001b) – I-
positions. There are the voices that are banished, ignored and rejected within the intrapersonal 
community (Satir, 1978): the I-positions that are consistently it-ified, dis-confirmed, and 
talked at, rather than with. As in the case of Martha, Stone and Winkelman (1989) suggest 
that the ‘vulnerable child’ is one of the voices that is most consistently disowned, alongside 
other voices that an individual may have been taught were unacceptable, such as the 
‘daimons’ (May, 1969) of rage and sexuality.  
 
Such subjugation of internal voices is likely to lead to a number of psychological difficulties. 
First, from a humanistic perspective (e.g. Rogers, 1959), each aspect of a person’s being is 
seen as having a positive potentiality. In other words, as Ferrucci (1982) writes, ‘All 
subpersonalities are expressions of vital elements of our being, however negative they may 
seem to us at first’ (p. 52). This means that, in subjugating certain aspects of his or her being, 
an individual locks up part of his or her full potentiality: losing touch with ‘some very 
beautiful, useful qualities’ (Vargiu, 1974, p. 54). A young woman, for instance, who silences 
her angry voice, then surrenders her ability to stand up for her own needs and demands. 
Moreover, the positive potentiality of each voice consists, not only in what it can contribute 
alone, but what it can contribute in dialogue with other voices. Hence, where particular voices 
are subjugated, the person’s ability to think creatively and innovatively through open 
intrapersonal communication is also likely to be attenuated.  
 
Furthermore, because, as Ferrucci (1982) suggests, these subpersonalities or I-positions are 
expressions of vital elements of our being, they will not simply go away if attempts are made 
to silence them. Rather, like a young child, the more they are told to shut up, the more they 
are likely to shout and demand repatriation. This will inevitably lead to an increase in anxiety 
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in the person: a constant sense of being threatened by something alien and undesirable. 
Moreover, because the individual, from the position of the dominant voices, refuses to 
dialogue with the subjugated voices, he or she then has little ability to mediate or control their 
expression. Martha, for instance, does not look her fears and anxieties in the face. She hopes 
that they will go away. In a social situation, then, she does little more than cling to the 
desperate hope that, this time, she will somehow, magically, not start to feel anxious. When 
the voice of terror does begin to emerge, therefore, she feels completely helpless in the face of 
it. She has no way of engaging with it, of retaining some sense of being in control. 
 
This leads on to a further reason why the existence of I-Me intrapersonal relationships – and 
the creation and maintenance of subjugated I-positions – may be closely associated with 
psychological distress. Because the subjugated I-positions are vital elements of an 
individual’s being, it is inevitable that, at certain times, a process of ‘dominance reversal’ 
(Hermans, 1996) will take place. Here, ‘a hidden or suppressed position can (without therapy) 
become, quite suddenly, more dominant than the position that corresponds with the trait the 
person considers as a prevalent and stable part of his or her personality’ (Hermans, 1996, p. 
46). The question, then, is what happens when an it-ified ‘me’ becomes a dominant ‘I’? One 
answer may be that, because the usually dominant I-positions have not established a 
dialogical relationship with this I-position, then the subjugated I-position has no way of 
dialoguing back. In other words, no bridge has been created between the usually dominant I-
positions and the usually subjugated I-position; such that, when the person comes to inhabit 
the latter, she or he has no way of connecting with the former. When Martha experiences 
extreme social anxiety, for instance, she is unable to connect with the adult, rational voice that 
‘knows’ that not everyone is staring at her. And because she is unable to connect with other 
voices, she is unable to stand back from her vulnerable I-position and regain some perspective 
on her situation. Rather, she experiences what Gersie (1994) refers to as an ‘intensificatory 
experience’, in which she is caught up in one mode of experiencing, without any support or 
triangulation from other perspectives.  
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THERAPEUTIC IMPLICATIONS 
Based on this analysis, it can be proposed that one of the central aims of therapy should be to 
help clients experience a greater prevalence of I-I intrapersonal encounters. Not only will 
such a development allow clients to experience more productive intrapersonal relationships, 
feel better about themselves, and more fully actualise their potential, but it will help them to 
establish a dialogue with their subjugated selves such that, in the midst of their intensificatory 
experiences, they may be able to take a step back and connect with other voices.  
 
Throughout the self-pluralistic therapies, numerous techniques and strategies have been 
developed to facilitate recognition and dialogue – and hence the possibility of a more I-I 
mode of relating – between the multiple I-positions. Cooper and Cruthers (1999) review these 
techniques, and suggest that they can be broadly divided into three categories. First, there are 
‘descriptive techniques’, in which an individual is encouraged to talk or write about his or her 
different I-positions, usually from the perspective of an adult I-position. Second, there are 
‘projective techniques’ in which an individual is encouraged to dialogue with, and between, 
his or her different I-positions by projecting them on to such medium as masks, paper, or the 
imagination. Third, there are ‘experiential techniques’, in which an individual is encouraged 
to fully embody particular I-positions, and to dialogue from one mode to another. ‘Two-Chair 
dialogue’ is one of the most well-known examples of this latter category (e.g. Elliot and 
Greenberg, 1997), in which a client is encouraged to sit in one chair and talk from one I-
position, and then to sit in another chair and talk back as another.  
 
From the psychotherapeutic literature, it would seem that such techniques can be an effective 
means of facilitating the emergence of I-I relationships between the various I-positions 
(Cooper and Cruthers, 1999). There are a number of reasons, however, why such techniques 
may be counter-therapeutic: reducing the prevalence of I-I relating rather than increasing it. 
First, these techniques, through encouraging clients to identify and define certain I-position, 
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may lead them to experience these I-positions in a more objectifying, fixed and detached way. 
The I-position becomes a definite thing, rather than a vague and ill-defined voice that is 
simply encountered; and, whilst it may be important for clients to go through a dialectical 
process of objectifying different voices, separating from them, and then re-encountering them 
at a deeper level, there is always the danger that the voices will remain isolated and 
objectified. Second, and closely related to this, as a client starts to identify and define certain 
voices, so there is the danger that these voices are taken out of the context of the dialogic 
whole, such that the client develops an increasingly fragmented view of his or her own being. 
In other words, at the level of the person-as-a-whole, these techniques may lead to an 
increasing it-ification. Third, such strategies may require the therapist to relate to his or her 
client in a relatively technical, if not mechanistic, way. And if, following a Vygotskian (1962) 
line of reasoning, intrapersonal relationships emerge as the internalisation of interpersonal 
relationships, then the establishment of an I-It dialogue between therapist and client may 
ultimately increase the prevalence of I-Me relating.  
 
An alterative approach, then, might be for the therapist to abandon any attempts to bring 
about an I-I intrapersonal encounter, and instead to concern him or herself with creating the 
conditions in which an I-Thou encounter may emerge between therapist and client. The 
rationale here would be that, through experiencing such an encounter, the client may begin to 
develop a confirming, ‘thou-ifiying’ voice within his or her own inner world. In other words, 
he or she may begin to internalise the voice of the therapist, such that he or she can also begin 
to relate to him or herself in this way. Certainly, I have witnessed this process in my own 
therapeutic work, where several clients have reported ‘hearing’ my voice in their day to day 
activities, telling them that it is ‘OK’ to feel scared or angry. Even if, as Hermans (2001a) 
points out, the internal voice is unlikely to be a direct replica of the external voice, it is likely 
to retain many of the key ways of relating associated with psychological well-being. There is 
also the possibility that, whilst the client will not develop a new I-position as a consequence 
of being related to in an I-Thou way, pre-existing I-positions may be modified and developed. 
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In particular, the central I-position may begin to develop more confirming, dialogic ways of 
relating to other I-positions, or may feel that its central, coordinating role has been validated 
through experiencing the openness of the therapist.  
 
Such a dialogical approach to therapy has been outlined by a number of clinicians, amongst 
them Friedman (1985), Hycner (1991), Jourard (1971), Mackewn (1997), Rogers (1957) and 
von Weizsäcker (1964). Here, the therapist – partially or wholly - attempts to put to one side 
all desires on the client and all attempts to categorise, judge, objectify or analyse him or her, 
and instead open him or herself up to – and be willing to confirm – the client as a unique, 
present totality. For Buber (1958), such an I-Thou therapeutic relationship also requires the 
therapist to practice the art of ‘inclusion’. This is defined by Friedman (1985) as ‘a bold 
imaginative swinging “with the intensest stirrings of one’s being” into the life of the other so 
that one can, to some extent, concretely imagine what the other person is thinking, willing and 
feeling and so that one adds something of one’s own will to what is thus apprehended’ (p. 
198). Clearly, this is very close to Rogers’ (1957) notion of empathy, but Friedman 
emphasises the fact that inclusion does not involve fully immersing one’s self in the world of 
the other, but being able to stand in both the other’s world and one’s own world at the same 
time. In attempting to facilitate the emergence of an I-Thou relationship, it is also necessary 
for the therapist to enter into the therapeutic relationship with the whole of his or her being - 
including his or her vulnerabilities and uncertainties (Farber, 1967) – and to open him or 
herself up to the possibility of being irrevocably changed by the client.  
 
From a polyphonic standpoint, however, such an approach also has its limitations. As Cooper 
(1996) points out, many clients tend to inhabit a relatively constant I-position within the 
therapeutic relationship: and generally the one of the rational, observing adult. Hence, whilst 
a client may experience confirmation of – and learn to confirm for themselves – their rational, 
adult I-position, their more subjugated I-positions – those that do not emerge within the 
therapeutic relationship – may fail to experience confirmation. Hence, the client may not 
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internalise a thou-ifying relationship to those I-positions that most need it, but only learn to 
confirm what is already relatively confirmed. 
 
It would seem important, therefore, that a therapist finds a way of helping his or her client 
bring their subjugated I-positions into the therapeutic relationship, such that the therapist can 
encounter and confirm the client in these particular I-positions. If this can take place, then 
there is the possibility that the client will internalise I-I relationships towards his or her 
subjugated I-positions for him or herself – thus establishing a bridge which may allow him or 
her some way out of his or her intensificatory experiences. Given the earlier discussion about 
technical approaches, however, the therapist needs to find a way of doing this that does not 
further it-ify the subjugated voices and the person-as-a-whole. From a Rogerian (1957) 
standpoint, one answer might be that the therapist simply needs to be patient, and that by 
creating the core conditions of warmth, empathy and congruence, the client will bring in his 
or her subjugated voices when he or she feels ready. It may be particularly useful, however, 
for therapist and client to focus on the dynamics of the therapeutic relationship, for it is often 
here that the client most directly occupies a subjugated I-position. Whilst Martha, for 
instance, occupied a very adult I-position in relationship to her social anxieties, her 
relationship to me came from a much more vulnerable position. It soon emerged that she was 
very afraid that I would judge and criticise her, and by giving her an opportunity to express 
these fears – and by empathising with, and confirming, them – she gradually internalised a 
more accepting attitude towards them herself. Another useful approach may be to encourage 
clients to ‘unpack’ – i.e. to describe in increasing levels of detail – the times in which they 
have occupied their subjugated I-positions. Through such a process, the many different facets 
of the subjugated I-position can be expressed, and confirmation by the therapist of these 
different facets allows the client to internalise such a relationship for themselves.  
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CONCLUSION 
This paper makes a number of contributions to a dialogic understanding of the self.  
 
First, building on the work of Hermans and Kempen (1993), it encourages researchers and 
practitioners in the self-pluralistic field to move beyond an exploration of the I-positions, per 
se, to develop a deeper understanding of the relationships between the different voices. This 
would seem to be a logical next step for the self-pluralistic field, and an important one with 
respect to the development of psychotherapeutic theory and practice.  
 
Second, it draws together a number of disparate ideas about the kinds of relationships that 
may exist between different I-positions, to develop a more embracing typology of 
intrapersonal relationships. Without doubt, there may be many alternate ways of 
characterising the relationships between I-positions, but the distinction between I-I and I-Me 
modes of self-relating may be a valuable starting point, and a distinction that is of particular 
relevance to the clinical field. Its value is also that it introduces into the field of dialogical self 
theory the possibility that some intrapersonal relationships may be much more dialogic than 
others.  
 
Third, this paper outlines a means whereby psychological well-being and psychological 
distress can be understood in dialogic terms. Psychological well-being is construed as the 
ability to relate to oneself – as well as to others – in an open, confirming and dialogic manner; 
and this proposal is as important to the field of clinical practice as a whole as it is to the field 
of dialogical self theory. In particular, it challenges the assumption that psychological well-
being is equivalent to being happy, proposing, instead, that psychological well-being is an 
openness to all facets of our being, as well as the being of others. 
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Fourth, this paper outlines a number of means whereby a clinician can help his or her clients 
towards greater psychological well-being – as understood in dialogic terms. Most importantly, 
perhaps, it suggests that a clinician need to find ways of helping his or her clients bring their 
subjugated I-positions into the therapeutic encounter, such that the therapist can model a 
confirming relationship towards them. It also suggests, however, that this is by no means an 
easy task, and requires the therapist to find a delicate balance between connecting with the 
subjugated I-positions, and engaging with the client as an non-fragmented whole. 
 
Finally, this paper draws one of the great philosophers of dialogue, Martin Buber, into the 
field of self-dialogicity. Buber’s work has been a notable absence in this field, and has much 
to contribute to an understanding of both interpersonal and intrapersonal relationships. Whilst 
Buber’s philosophy raises some important challenges to the work of other dialogical theorists 
(e.g. Linell and Marková, 1993) – most notably, the idea that not all interpersonal or 
intrapersonal communication takes a truly dialogic form – in essence, it is entirely consistent 
with a dialogic outlook. It fiercely rejects the notion of a self-contained, Cartesian self, and 
emphasises the vital significance of human beings’ dialogic capabilities. 
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